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1 “[Emily] had to think – she was the only one of us who had that to do,” or so Emily
Dickinson’s  sister,  Lavinia,  recalled.  Her  famous  pronouncement  serves  as  an  apt
epigraph  to  this  collection  of  essays,  whose  ambition  is  “to  understand  [Emily
Dickinson’s]  poetry  as  philosophical  practice”  (1).  As  the  editors,  Jed  Deppman,
Marianne Noble, and Gary Lee Stonum, contend in their introduction to the volume,
not only was Dickinson “a serious thinker” (1), but “her aesthetic practices were of a
piece with her philosophical inquiries” (4): although many of her poems elevate poetry
and seem to denigrate philosophy, her writing actually makes the distinction moot, as
her poems turn out to be the very sites, not so much where her thinking resides, as
where  it  takes  place  and  shape,  where  it  happens  and  develops.  Following  Jed
Deppman’s own 2008 Trying to Think with Emily Dickinson,1 all the essays gathered in this
highly valuable and remarkably homogenous collection testify to the ambitious reach
of Dickinson’s poetic thinking: offering original tacks on well-known poems, as well as
foregrounding lesser-known pieces,  the  contributors  succeed in  demonstrating that
Dickinson’s  “business”  was  not  only  “circumference,”  but  also  “thinking.”2 More
accurately, the various essays show, each in their own ways, how much both practices
were  in  fact  synonymous  for  Dickinson,  locating,  in  the  very  workings  of  poetic
composition, her passionate quarrel with philosophy.
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2 The twelve chapters that make up the collection follow “the chronology of the history
of philosophy” (5), roughly from Hume to Heidegger, and fall into two main sections,
one looking at “Dickinson and the Philosophy of her Time” and the other at “Dickinson
and  Modern  Philosophy.”  Reaching  back  to  seventeenth-  and  eighteenth-century
philosophical,  scientific  and  religious  systems  of  thought  while  recalling  the  latest
concepts  in  vogue  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  the  essays  gathered  in  the  first
section explore Dickinson’s response to the philosophical “ethos of her age” (91) and
consider  her  engagement  with  contemporary  philosophies  of  the  mind  (Michael
Kearns),  Humean Common Sense  (Melanie  Hubbard),  Darwinist  science  and Biblical
Higher criticism (Jane Donahue Eberwein), but also with the doctrines of Christology
(Linda Freedman), as well as the philosophies of Hegel and Schlegel (Daniel Fineman),
and that of Kierkegaard (Jim von der Heydt). Complicating the notion of “influence,”
the  essays  in  the  first  section  combine  historicist  approaches  with  philosophical
synthesis and literary analysis to sketch a much broader conceptual landscape, one in
which Dickinson, recluse as she was, was obviously immersed and which informed her
poetic  endeavor,  like  that  of  most  American  Romantics.  The  essays  in  the  second
section, on the other hand, look ahead at later philosophies with which Dickinson’s
poetry resonates, from Nietzsche’s perspectivism (Shira Wolosky) and William James’s
pragmatism (Renée Tursi) to Sartre’s existentialism (Farhang Erfani), Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology  (Marianne  Noble),  Levinas’s  ethics  (Megan  Craig),  and  Heidegger’s
philosophy of Being (Jed Deppman). The essays in this second section picture Dickinson
as resolutely modern, that is, also, as anti-Romantic, thus problematizing usefully her
vexed relation to the Romantic literary and philosophical legacy. Doing so, they suggest
that  the  questions  that  troubled her  throughout  her  poetic  career  equally  agitated
much of the twentieth century and are, as such, also constitutive of our philosophical
modernity.
3 Beyond the many philosophies that are made to bear upon Dickinson’s poetry, and for
which Nietzschean perspectivism such as Shira Wolosky investigates it (131-50) works
as a powerful analytical figure, all contributions across both sections are bound by a
common method, that of “reading with,” or “reading in the light of” to borrow a phrase
that, coincidentally, Linda Freedman, Farhang Erfani and Megan Craig all use in their
respective chapters (70,  175,  208).  As Renée Tursi  claims,  from her own pragmatist
perspective, “Whether Dickinson can be regarded as a pragmatist or not ends up being,
ironically, an antipragmatic question. The more useful question would be to explore
what comes of our reading Dickinson’s poetry as pragmatists ourselves. As James would
have us ask the question: What difference does it make for us, one way or another, to
find pragmatism reverberating in her [poetry]”? (152) Such critical pragmatism drives
most  of  the  essays  gathered  in  this  collection  and  sets  the  stage  for a  series  of
compelling explications  de  texte,  such as  Megan Craig’s  attentive  and generous  close
reading of “I dreaded that first Robin, so” (Fr347, 215-20)3 in terms of Levinas’s ethics of
the other, as an experience and account of the arresting discovery of “the finite packed
into the infinite” (220).  Likewise,  Michael  Kearns,  Daniel  Fineman,  and Renée Tursi
offer complementary readings of “Perception of an object costs” (Fr1103) as, variously,
anatomizing  the  inner  workings  of  the  mind  and  its  relation  to  the  world  and
countering  the  philosophy  of  the  mind  of  Thomas  Upham  (28),  particularizing
experience in the face of abstract universal systems like Hegel’s and Schlegel’s (95), and
highlighting the “attitude of wonder [that] accompanies a defamiliarized and widened
perception […] against Humean skepticism and Kantian critique” (193). Such instance
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of multiple readings is not isolated: in the course of the volume, several poems are
repeatedly  singled  out  and  their  meaning  is  enriched  with  each  new  reading  (the
citation index provided by the editors is  especially useful  in this regard,  even as it
reveals  the  contributors’  extensive  mapping  of  the  Dickinson  corpus).  The  fruitful
confrontation of different critical frameworks and perspective on a series of common
objects is indeed one of the book’s signature features and one of its main achievements.
4 In  the  end,  the  Dickinson  that  emerges  from  this  collection  is  both  familiar  and,
fittingly,  decentered.  Several  chapters  investigate  anew  long-standing  debates  in
Dickinson  scholarship,  such  as  her  complex  relation  with  Christian  doctrine  or
Emersonian Transcendentalism. Similarly, most essays revisit the difficult articulation
between body and mind, matter and spirit, revelation and representation, self-creation
and self-discovery that underscores her poetic enterprise, but also such issues as the
pluralization  of  the  self  and  the  processual  nature  of  consciousness,  as  well  as
Dickinson’s experiment with language as a “power that involves both assertion and its
limit”  (Wolosky,  141).  One  of  the  most  uncanny  and  thought-provoking  effects
performed by this rich collection, however, is to present us with a Dickinson that is
somewhat at odds with her own enduring image as a poet who saw “New Englandly”
(Fr256), that is, with a “European” or “Continental” Dickinson, a “French” Dickinson
even, whose poetry dialogues across space and time with various forms and modes of
existentialist  and  phenomenological  thinking,  from  Sartre  and  Merleau-Ponty  to
Levinas,  revealing the full  reach of the “existential philosophy of intimacy” (Erfani,
187) of “a thinker of increments and minutiae” (Craig, 226).
5 If some chapters read at times, and quite inevitably but also usefully, like philosophical
précis  and  if  some  contributions  tend  sometimes  to  focus  essentially  on  the
philosophical overtones and implications of her lexical choices rather than consider
also  the  possible  distortions  created  by  the  dynamics  of  her  poetic  thinking,  the
collection as  a  whole is  remarkably attune to the speculative nature of  Dickinson’s
poetry and to the frictions between the concepts she scrutinizes and puts to the test
and  their  poetic,  tropic,  linguistic  forms.  As  such,  it  will  be  of  major  interest  to
Dickinson scholars, as well as to all readers of nineteenth-century American literature,
and  more  generally  to  anyone  working  on  the  relations  between  literature  and
philosophy. For  it  is  most  successful  when  the  contributors  delve  into,  as  they
repeatedly do, those critical moments when Dickinson’s writing does not coincide with
itself,  or  rather,  when her  composition and tropes  work against  the  paraphrasable
philosophical contents of the poem: to borrow Jed Deppman’s effective words in the
concluding chapter which summarize the methodological stance of the whole volume,
“the thetic essence [of a Dickinson poem] […] cannot be equated with the poem itself,”
thereby confronting us with “a hyperconscious thinker pressuring language to reveal
patterns she cannot find in rational prose, lucid as it may be” (243). Such is Dickinson’s
distinct and lasting philosophical contribution as a poet.
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NOTES
1. Jed Deppman, Trying to Think with Emily Dickinson, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press,
2008.
2. “My Business is Circumference,” she wrote Thomas Wentworth Higginson in the summer of
1862  (The  Letters  of  Emily  Dickinson,  3  vols.,  Thomas  H.  Johnson  and  Theodora  Ward,  eds.,
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958, letter 268).
3. The Poems of Emily Dickinson, R. W. Franklin, ed., 3 vols., Cambridge, Harvard University Press,
1998. Citation by poem number.
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